War in the Rear on the Eastern Front - Part 3

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TacAide
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War in the Rear on the Eastern Front - Part 3

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War in the Rear on the Eastern Front – Part 3


The Front Behind the Front – January 1943 to Late 1944

In the second half of 1943 the Partisan Front was capable of launching major operations closely coordinated with Soviet military offensives. This capability was largely due to the measures taken by the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement at Stavka, the Soviet Army Strategic Command, in the winter of 1942-43 to organise and control partisan activities behind the German front lines. Headed by Chief of Staff, Ponomarenko, the Staff had its liaison networks in the Military Councils of the Fronts and Armies. NKVD, SMERSH and GRU trained groups of partisans (effectively, special forces units) and dropped them into German rear areas with the task of organising and training local partisan units. Essential members of each ‘special forces’ group were radio operators and intelligence gathering officers. Some of the commanders of the special units, such as Dmitry Medvedev, later became well-known partisan leaders. The measures proved remarkably effective as the rejuvenated front engaged the German security forces in a series of offensive operations as the year 1943 unfolded .

Setting the Stage - 3rd Phase of the War in the Rear.

By Spring 1943, the partisans had about a third of a million men under arms. They were organized into brigades, groups, regiments, and battalions, equipped with heavy weapons, artillery and even tanks, many of them captured from the Germans.

In response the Germans streamlined their anti-partisan organization, strengthened their security forces, and adopted aggressive counter-measures. Most effective of these were large-scale encirclement operations during which the Germans employed, depending on the area, forces from one division to a reinforced army corps with up to half a dozen combat divisions.

In terms of battalions, the total strength of some operations (for example, Unternehmen ‘Zigeunerbaron’ near Bryansk) reached 40 battalions, reinforced by tanks, artillery and aircraft. None of these operations was fully successful because of the tactical advantage their knowledge of the difficult terrain gave to the partisans and because the Germans lacked the strength to throw tight encirclement rings around the operational areas.

Map of the Notorious ‘Partisan Box’

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The Orel Salient - Setting the Scene

Supplying the 2nd Panzer Army – A Case Study

The spring of 1943 found the German Supply Plan to re-supply front-line units was under severe strain. In the notorious ‘partisan box’ attacks on supply trains and motor columns were seriously hampering military operations at the front. The unpleasant consequences were soon felt in all supply operations, for example, by the 2nd Panzer Army already engaged in desperate defensive operations in the Orel-Bryansk area.
The main supply route for the 2nd Panzer Army, comprising about 35 divisions, was by the double-track railroad line Gomel-Unecha-Bryansk-Orel, which at the same time had to transport part of the supply for the adjoining 2nd Army in the Kursk area. In addition, a single-track railroad through Krichev-Surazh, which joined the main line at Unecha, was available for occasional use and provided some relief. Another single-track line from Smolensk through Roslavl to Bryansk served as an additional supply route. Motor transportation depended primarily on the main Smolensk-Roslavl-Bryansk highway. This road crossed some of the worst partisan areas and for that reason and because of its poor condition, was used only in emergencies and was bypassed whenever possible.
Worst still, all road and rail supply routes had to pass through the forests west of Lokot (south of Bryansk). The entire area was a hotbed of partisan activity, formed from bands of Russian soldiers cut off in the Vyazma-Bryansk encirclement battle during Barbarossa and now led by detachments of the partisan ‘Special Forces’ inserted by Stavka the previous winter. They constituted a serious menace to the deep flank and the rear of the Second Panzer Army.
As a consequence, German communication and re-supply lines into the Orel salient were exposed to partisan attacks from all sides, with dire consequences for maintaining the fighting effectiveness of front-line units facing the might of the Red Army. At the height of battle such disruption could be of decisive importance in hampering strategic troop movements, as well as transportation of fuel and ammunition.

German Counter Measures

To counter the threat to supply in the field, the 2nd Panzer Army had the following very limited Security Divisions in the Orel operational area:

One security division to protect communication lines running north and southwest of Bryansk and to conduct antipartisan operations in the forests north and northwest of the city and in the area around Kletnya.
Several security battalions to guard the depots in the vicinity of Bryansk and to protect the road and railroad line to Orel, as well as the connecting roads in the area of Zhisdra; and some native Russian formations to provide security around the town of Trubchevsk (south of Bryansk). (It’s worth noting that the these native security units had been formed initially to protect the local population against marauding bands of scattered Russian soldiers.)
All the security forces mentioned above were engaged day and night in anti-partisan activities. They guarded the depots, bridges, and other vital installations. They furnished security detachments for the protection of trains that had to pass through dangerous areas. On the roads they manned the control points established for security purposes and escorted the columns of supply trucks from one point to the next.
In view of the large number of partisan bands and the vastness of the partisan-infested areas, it is not surprising that these security units fell far short of accomplishing all their tasks.
The task faced by the forces available was enormous, in any insurgency situation small groups of determined fighters can tie down huge numbers of security forces. In this particular area of operations, covered in vast tracts of forests and swamp that units of White Russians had held out until 1926 or 1927 without ever being captured by Soviet Government forces, it was virtually impossible.
Thus, the huge counter-insurgency task facing the rear security elements in the Orel-Bryansk area was but a microcosm of the security situation along the Eastern Front in the Summer of 1943. The latter half of the year was to further increase pressure on the already overstretched security elements.

Orel Salient – Breadbasket of White Russia

From the above narrative, it becomes obvious that, beginning in the Autumn of 1942, the chain of events that led to Army Group Centre gradually losing control over the Orel region, an area of great agricultural value, were exacerbated by the absence of adequate rear security forces which could not be spared anywhere else.

As early as June 1941 in order to feed the field army and assure the delivery of a certain quota of grain and potatoes from the local harvest, agricultural control officers (Landwirtschaftsfuehrer) were posted throughout the entire army area to supervise and direct the harvest operations carried out by the local inhabitants. Equipped only with small arms and scattered widely to include even the smallest villages in the area, these agricultural control posts could not be expected to offer effective resistance in the event of partisan raids. The 1942 harvest had no sooner been brought in when reports about increased partisan activities began to mount. Numerous partisan raids on harvest control points had the result of frustrating gradually the entire agricultural program until finally the German control organisation was virtually driven out of all harvest areas.
Local inhabitants reported that the partisans were continuously seizing and carrying off grain supplies. Other accounts indicated that Russian airplanes were landing every other night in the partisan-held forests around Bryansk, supposedly to pick up the grain seized by the partisans and to transport it to the east. These reports could actually be verified by German reconnaissance which observed landing lights in various places. But since these air strips were located in areas held by strong partisan units, any interference from the outside was impossible.

Hearts and Minds - The Propaganda War

In addition to adding to the deteriorating military situation, the failure to defeat the partisan forces had three further serious consequences for the Germans:
Firstly the Soviets demonstrated to the local population that they succeeded in exploiting an enemy occupied area to the advantage of their own war effort, while the Germans, ostensibly the occupying power, were unable to take effective countermeasures.
Secondly, whenever German troop movements or anti-partisan actions were carried out, they were also used as an opportunity for salvaging and removing local stores of all kinds with the local population was increasingly caught in the middle of a devastating war of survival between the opposing forces.
Thirdly, the operations in the salient demonstrated that a close liaison existed between the Russian leaders behind and in front of the German lines was clearly noticeable. Immediately before and during various Red Army offensives partisan bands were concentrated at strategic points, and their activities increased to the scale of major operations.

An Examle of the Type of Armoured Locomotives Used by the Germans

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Autumn 1943 – The Partisan Assault on Rail Communications

As I have already pointed out, throughout the Russian campaign the railroads remained the chief carrier of supplies to the front. German logisticians had hoped that the lines would be available and had constantly emphasized their vital importance to all operations in the East. In July 1943 between Smolensk-Brjansk-Minsk partisans launched 841 attacks on rail communications, in all 298 steam engines, many of them heavily armoured, and 1222 train wagons were destroyed and 44 bridges blown up.
In the autumn of 1943, for example, four supply trains were destroyed simultaneously at the Osipovichi railroad station, South of Orel. The scale of the destruction was so great that all traffic on that line had to be suspended for almost four weeks. Investigations revealed that a magnetic mine had been attached, presumably by a native railroad worker, to one of the tank cars of a gasoline train. When the mine went off it set the car on fire, and the spreading blaze soon enveloped the entire train. An ammunition train standing nearby was ignited and blew sky high, setting fire in turn to an adjacent forage train. Finally, a fourth train loaded with "Tiger" tanks suffered the same fate and also burned out completely. The shortage of personnel as well as the lack of extra locomotives made it impossible to save even part of the trains by removing individual cars. Moreover, the explosion of the ammunition train had caused considerable damage to many of the switches, so that the line itself was no longer in operating condition.
Similar disruptions were caused when armoured locomotives were fired upon with antitank weapons. In addition, various acts of sabotage were committed by Russian railroad personnel who, for lack of German manpower, had to be employed in large numbers to keep the railroads in operation. About 110,000 Russian railroad men were used in the sector of Army Group Center alone. At a later stage, demolitions were frequently combined with raids on disabled trains, which resulted in even greater losses of rolling stock and longer delays in the restoration of the lines.
An excerpt from the monthly report of the Chief of Transportation, Army Group Center, covering the period from 1 to 31 August 1943, contained the following information:
"Despite the employment of special alert units for the protection of the railroad lines, partisan activity increased by 25 percent during August 1943 and reached a record of 1,392 incidents as compared with 1,114 for July. The daily average amounted to 45 demolitions. In 364 cases the rails were cut simultaneously in more than ten places. Individual demolition points amounted to 20,505, while 4,528 mines could be removed. During the night from 2 to 3 August the partisans began to put into effect a program of large-scale destruction. Numerous demolitions were carried out which caused a serious curtailment of all railroad traffic and a considerable loss of railroad materiel. Within two nights the six to seven thousand miles of track in the area were cut in 8,422 places, while another 2,478 mines were detected and removed prior to exploding. Several lines could not be put back into operation for a considerable time."
"Another major handicap in the operation of the railroads was the increasing number of sabotage acts, committed chiefly by native workers under partisan orders. These acts resulted chiefly in a severe shortage of locomotives. In many instances, the so-called eastern volunteer units (native formations) which were employed to protect the railroad lines made common cause with the partisans and took German weapons along with them. In one case, for instance, an entire Russian security detachment of 600 men went over to the partisans. On 17 August 1943 this force attacked the Krulevshchizna railroad station. Using the machine guns, mortars, and antitank guns which they had taken with them at the time of their desertion, the Russians caused considerable damage. German losses in that engagement amounted to 240 dead and 491 wounded. Altogether, partisan activities from 1 to 31 August 1943 resulted in damage to 266 locomotives and 1,373 railroad cars; about 160 miles of track were rendered unserviceable."

The consequences for the German military operations in the region were considerable. The major partisan operations against German rail supply routes are recorded in some detail in the available accounts of partisan history and show that between July and November 1943 upwards of 300,000 partisans took part:

Operation "Rails War", August 3 - September 15, 1943. A major operation of partisan formations against the railroad communications intended to disrupt the German reinforcements and supplies for the Battle of Kursk and later the Battle of Smolensk. It involved concentrated actions by more than 100,000 partisan fighters from Belarus, the Leningrad Oblast, the Kalinin Oblast, the Smolensk Oblast, the Oryol Oblast and Ukraine within an area 1000 km along the front and 750 km wide. Reportedly, more than 230,000 rails were destroyed, along with many bridges, trains and other railroad infrastructure. The operation seriously incapacitated German logistics and was instrumental in the Soviet victory at Kursk
Operation "Concerto", September 19 - November 1, 1943. "Concerto” was a major operation of partisan formations against the railroad communications intended to disrupt the German reinforcements and supplies for the Battle of the Dnieper and on the direction of the Soviet offensive in the Smolensk and Gomel directions. Partisans from Belarus, Karelia, the Kalinin Oblast and the Crimea participated in the operations. The area of the operation was 900 km along the front (excluding Karelia and Crimea) and 400 km wide. Despite bad weather that only permitted the airlift of less than a half of the planned supplies, the operation lead to a 35-40% decrease in the railroad capacity in the area of operations. This was critical for the success of Soviet military operations in the autumn of 1943. In Belarus alone the partisans claimed the destruction of more than 90,000 rails along with 1,061 trains, 72 railroad bridges and 58 Axis garrisons. According to the Soviet historiography, Axis losses totaled more than 63,000 soldiers.

Th scale and frequency of the attacks increased during the first half of 1944. Partisan historiography details the major operations undertaken against German rail supply operations in 1944. The scale of operations are such as to leave no doubt that Belarusian partisans played a major part in the success of the Soviet Offensive, Operation Bagration, June 22-August 19, 1944. They were often considered the fifth front (along with the 1st Baltic Front, 1st Belorussian Front, 2nd Belorussian Front and 3rd Belorussian Front

Operation Bagration: During June 1944, air supplies to Partisan groups in the central sector were stepped up considerably in preparation for the large Russian offensive, operation Bagration. On the night of the 19th of June Partisan forces opened the preparation for the Russian offensive with their greatest single blow of the war against the German lines of communication. They launched large scale attacks across the sector, carrying out 9,600 rail demolitions and raids against German held villages and supply depots. They carried out a further 892 rail demolitions the following night, with the Minsk-Orsha and Mogilev-Vitebsk rail lines being hit particularly hard and almost completely paralysed for several days. As the offensive swept through their concentration areas, the Partisans worked in close cooperation with the regular units. For the most part they held their formations and hit at their targets with a good degree of precision. In a number of instances they were identified fighting in the line as units under direct Red Army control. As the advance neared the Polish border, the units slowly fell apart. Many were absorbed into the line Divisions, while others broke off in small groups in an effort to avoid induction into the Regular Army.

Counter-Insurgency Unit Personnel

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Brief Description of German Counter-Insurgency (Anti-Partisan) Operations.

German rear area forces were engaged in almost non-stop counter-insurgency operations, many were small, probably at reinforced battalion level. Others were on such a scale as to warrant the title of mayor military engagements of which little is known.

Counter-Insurgency Operations during 1942
The earliest planned offensive anti-partisan operation was Unternehmen ‘Bamberg’ in the area of Hłusk-Pariczi-Oktiabrskij to the south of Bobrujsk. The operation had finished the planning stage by 26 February 1942 and conducted by the 707th infantry division, which had been transferred specifically to the area for this purpose supported by various local units and police units. The 203rd security division, responsible for the area, drew up the operational plan and defined the aims as follows:
a) neutralisation of the main partisan bands by reducing their military capabilities and by forcing them into inhospitable areas of the forested regions
b) pacification of the country by providing security for the local inhabitants
c) collection of grain and livestock that the agricultural control officers (Landwirtschaftsfuehrer) had been unable to collect.
This operation was only partially successful because of the late arrival of some security police units at their start lines.
Two other operations that took place in the same month were Unternehmen 'Munich' and 'Hanover'. They were conducted in the Yelnya-Dorogobuzh area and involved the 221st Security Division. The operations were only partially successful as the due largely to a lack of experience in large scale counter-insurgency encirclement operations and the detailed knowledge the partisans had of the local terrain, added to this fuel shortages and appalling weather conditions.
Unternehmen 'Vogelsang', a large-scale operation launched, on the 5th of June by Army Group Centre in the area of Bryansk, to secure the rail lines and highways, was more successful. The operation destroyed supply dumps and forced large partisan detachments to retreat deeper into the forested areas. However the partisan force remained largely intact.

Counter Insurgency Operations during 1943
In an effort to halt the attacks in the Bryansk area, a series of five anti Partisan operations were mounted in May and June 1943. Unternehmen 'Zigennebaron' and 'Tannhaeuser', forces assemb;led for the operation were three infantry Divisions, two panzer Divisions, a Hungarian light Division and a number of security, Ost and Volkswehr units and were carried out to the south and southwest of Bryansk,
At the same time, Unternehmen 'Nachbarhilfe', which included the 221st Security Division and Ost and Volkswehr units, cleared an area to the west of the location.
Unternehmen 'Freischutze', which utilized the 6th Infantry and 5th Panzer Divisions to the north and the smaller Unternehmen 'Osterie' to the east.
The five operations were reasonably successful, in that the partisan groups in the areas were temporarily dispersed and separated from their supplies. However because none of the groups were destroyed, they used the late summer and Autumn to regroup and reequip. Some further smaller operations ( such as Unternehmen 'Cottbus') were carried out in the area by a mixed force of Army, SS, SD and native volunteer units but were largely unsuccessful and after the withdrawl of operational units, partisan units gradually resumed their attacks.

Counter Insurgency Operations in the ‘Partisan Box’ during 1944
In April 1944, German forces in the central sector mounted a series of large anti partisan operations, from April the 11th until the 23rd of June, against groups concentrated in the areas west of Vitebsk and Orsha. The largest are listed here for reference:
Unternehmen 'Regenschauer', utilized elements of the 3rd Panzer Army, which attacked westward down the left bank of the Dvina River, into the lake region just south of Polotsk. Contrary to expectations, the Partisans there, caught by surprise and mistakenly believing that the Germans would withdraw after the operation, pulled back across the lake line and into the depths of the Ushachi area with hardly a fight, despite orders to the contrary. The attacking force consolidated its gains and dug in.

Unternehmen 'Fruhlingsfest' followed almost immediately and involved the units which had executed 'Regenschauer', remaining in place along the lakes as a blocking force, joined in the north and west by elements of the 16th Army. Additional elements of the 3rd Panzer Army and a large force of Police and SS units drove into the area as the hammer against the anvil of the blocking line. When the attack groups were joined by elements of the 95th Infantry Division, the pressure became too heavy, and the Partisans began a series of attempts to break out to the south. The operations resulted in heavy casualties and considerable disruption of the Partisan networks.
Unternehmen 'Kormoran' beginning on 25th May and ending around 17th June, was probably the final operation carried out in the area of Borisov, Minsk and Molodechno. The operation utilized elements of the 3rd Panzer Army striking westward through the Senno area, and police and SS units attacking to the east and northeast from the vicinity of Molodechno. To prevent a mass escape of bands to the north and south, additional elements of the 3rd Panzer Army had set up a blocking line on the northern fringe of the region while Police and SS units had established similar positions along the rail lines to the south and southwest. Again the operation was reasonably successful, but had to be ended before its conclusion due to the commencement of the major Soviet offensive, Operation Bagration. which eventually led to the collapse of the German Army Group.
By August 1944 the 11th Guards had reached the outskirts of Karachev, midway between Orel and Briansk causing the decision to evacuate the salient, which had clearly become untenable with the threat to the main rail line over which virtually all supplies had to come.

Soviet Propaganda Poster
The text praises Sabotage Activity in the German Rear

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Endgame
The partisan contribution to the Soviet war effort on the Eastern Front cannot be underestimated, operating behind the front lines and among a population largely hostile to their ideological leader Stalin, their growth was remarkable. According to Soviet sources, from 90,000 partisans (including underground) by the end of 1941 it grew to 220,000 in 1942, and to more than 550,000 by mid 1943 numbering, according to some sources 750,000 by late 1944 . They inflicted thousands of casualties on Axis forces, constantly disrupted the German rear areas, destroying lines of communication and supply and exacting a heavy toll on morale and resources. The extent of the Partisan threat resulted in the Germans deploying 25 dedicated security Divisions, 30 separate security Regiments and more than 100 police Battalions, alone to help safeguard the rear areas.
In Belarus alone, according to Soviet historians, the partisans killed, injured and took prisoner some 500,000 soldiers of German and satellite forces. The irony is that after the war some historians attribute that the Soviet reactions to returning partisans were no better than that to Soviet POWs. Operating thousands of kilometers from the front lines, with little central authority allowed some of the fighters to develop their own ideas that in many cases challenged the Soviet system. The Soviets viewed these actions with extreme hostility, and after the liberation of the territory, all partisan fighters had to pass through NKVD interrogation, some, particularly officers, were arrested on various grounds ending up in labor camps.
German rear line security units, on the other hand, are often overshadowed by the more attractive panzer and motorized Divisions that continue to fascinate readers of the Eastern Front conflict. Writers on the subject indicate that records on the operations of any of the Security Divisions after 1943 are almost impossible to locate, but what is certain is that they existed in a theatre of operations with limited resources, in harsh environmental conditions and were responsible for vast operational areas and lived with the brutality perpretrated by the partisans themselves.

On the other hand Omer Bartov in his The Eastern Front 1941-45: German Troops and the Barbarisation of Warfare attributes Nazi ideology, an anti-Slavic tradition and the personalities of both operational and tactical level officers as influencing the degree of brutality that their units inflicted.

At any rate increasing numbers of historians are examined the conduct of the German Army on the
Eastern Front during the Second World War, I expect we must await their final verdict.

Notes:
The source material used to compile the text in all three articles is taken from many different sources. All photos displayed are assumed to be in the public domain.
I have acknowledged the source where I have quoted from a published work.
Bibliography:
Leonid I. Grenkevich;The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1945: Critical Analysis of Historiography
Hill, Alexander, The war behind the Eastern Front : the Soviet partisan movement in North-West Russia, 1941-1944. Frank Cass, 2005 (ISBN 0714657115)

Sources:
Feldgrau
US Army Centre of Military History
Wikipedia
Matthew Cooper. The phantom war: The German Struggle Against Soviet Partisans, 1941-1944 (Macdonald and Janes, 1979).
Department of the (US) Army, Pamphlet 20-240, Washington, DC 1951
Franz repper
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Re: War in the Rear on the Eastern Front - Part 3

Post by Franz repper »

Great read good sir
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TacAide
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Joined: Thu Feb 28, 2008 10:40 pm

Re: War in the Rear on the Eastern Front - Part 3

Post by TacAide »

Franz repper wrote:Great read good sir
Thanks Franz for the comment. Makes the research on this littleknown 'front' of WW2 worthwhile, although there are huge gaps in the actual historical narrative of this type of military action, generally referred to as "counter-insurgency/patriotic uprising", depending on your views.

All we have is a perception of what took place, little real information from German records after '43 or Soviet sources for the whole three years on this "dirty war", in comparison to the main battles on the front.

At and rate thats the final short article, I hope the military buffs on the site got something from them.
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