Writing on any aspect of a particular state-sponsored counterinsurgency operation is fraught with difficulties in evaluating and drawing conclusions on the value or effectiveness of the actions. This is particularly true of German counterinsurgency operations from Late 1941 to Mid 1944, more commonly referred to as ‘the anti-partisan war’, on the Eastern Front.
Unfortunately, many Soviet studies of the partisan war accessible to Western audiences, such as the personal account by Nicolai Obrynba "Red Partisan," tend to be of questionable accuracy. Until quite recently, official State organs routinely vetted most of these books for political and ideological reasons. Even now, two decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, political pressure and limited archival access, prevents historians from researching or revealing many events subject to censorship in the past. Many countries refuse to open archives that may contain embarrassing material. For this reason alone there is always the suspicion that the Soviets still have much to conceal about aspects of their ‘Great Patriotic War’ behind the lines.
I have prepared three short articles looking at aspects of this little-known war from a German perspective and its impact on the German war effort on the Eastern Front. Two of the articles have already been published on the Irish Axis Forum and it is felt that readers of Panzergrenadier may be interested in the content.
Part 1: Early to Mid 1941: Deals with OKH preparations for rear-area security to support the German offensive and protect supply lines to the front.
Part 2: Late 1941 to Late 1942: Looks at the growth of the Partisan forces and their attacks on supply lines in areas behind the German Army Groups. German ‘partisan drives’ and other counter-measures taken to protect the supply lines.
Part 3: Early 1943 to Mid 1944. Considers the impact of the emergence of the Partisan Front, the growth of their forces in the field and increasing disruption of German re-supply to front-line forces. The operations launched against German forces, their response and finally the German retreat to the Soviet border in Mid 1944
THE FRONT BEHIND THE FRONT
War in the Rear – The German Forces war against Soviet Partisans on the Eastern Front 1941 to 1944
Introduction
The general view of the war fought in the area behind the German front-line on the Eastern Front between the Summer of 1941 and the Autumn of 1943 is distorted to the extent that little consideration is given to understanding the true nature of the fighting, the considerable preparations made by the German Army to counter the security threat and the war of attrition conducted by both sides. This is understandable as the layman’s view of this aspect of the partisan war must continue to rely on limited Russian sources, sources that routinely describe the war as part of the “Great Patriotic War” in which the German invader faced a united population, an immense army with a limitlessness supply of expendable human resources in an area covering some 120,000kms square.
Even those few historians who are better informed about the details of the Soviet inspired partisan war share the common misperception that OKW were caught off-guard by their failure to plan for a “terrorist campaign” to use the modern term and that they consistently underestimated the Russian capacity for this type of combat. That said, the ability of the Soviet regime to retain operational control and to co-ordinate the major battles that occurred in the operational areas of the front-line could , must be acknowledged. During the second and third phases of the war in the German rear partisan operations involved heavily armed units numbering hundreds of thousands,.
On the other hand, to reach any understanding of the severity of German responses requires sufficient knowledge and an understanding of the how the partisans impacted German front line operations. For example, that sabotage and disruption operations carried out by partisan forces played a significant part in the failure of Operation Zitadelle, to name but one.
How did the partisans influence military operations at the front? The example may be given of Operation "Rails War" (July 13 - September 15, 1943) was one of the major operations carried out by partisan formations against the railroad communications intended to disrupt the German reinforcements and supplies for Zitadelle (5th July – 18 July 1943) and later the Battle of Smolensk (7 August – 2nd Oct 1943). It involved concentrated actions by more than 150,000 partisan fighters from Belarus, the Smolensk Oblast, the Oryol Oblast and Ukraine within an area 1000 km along the front and 750 km wide. Reportedly, more than 230,000 rails were destroyed, along with many bridges, trains and other railroad infrastructure. The operation seriously incapacitated German logistics, to say the least and was instrumental in the Soviet victory at Kursk. (1)
SUPPLY UNITS ON LINE-OF-MARCH
PART 1: GERMAN FORCES PLANNING AND PREPARATIONS FOR RE-SUPPLY
AND SECURITY MEASURES ON THE EASTERN FRONT
Planning the Re-supply - Estimating the Situation
German staff officers wrote in later years that when the first plans were laid for the campaign against Russia, planning on how to secure all the necessary supply routes through the vast areas of the future theatre of operations played a significant part. They were aware that a considerably greater enemy effort against the German supply lines was to be expected than in previous campaigns with their relatively short lines of communications, or in any of the areas already occupied. But the main point in all deliberations and the primary factor in all phases of military preparation was the vast expanse of Russian territory. Supply routes would have to be considerably longer than ever before and therefore more susceptible to disruptions of all kinds. This was true not only for all roads, rail lines, and waterways, but also for all key points at which supplies were to be stored. Staff assessments of the type and extent of essential security measures and the strength of the forces required to eliminate these security threats, led to the conclusion that a new approach had to be found. Unlike previous campaigns, the operations zone of an army now appeared to be much less exposed than the areas farther to the rear. Front-line areas are always the scene of strong concentrations of forces which have firm control over the local rail and road net and are in a position to keep the local population under close surveillance without the need to employ a large force exclusively for that purpose.
At the kernel of all planning was the fact that rear area communications are comparable to the blood vessels of the human body. The most capable brain, the strongest arm, the most powerful heart can no longer fully perform its functions if the blood cannot follow its prescribed course through the vital arteries. German forces in Russia were faced a conventional war with a new dimension of added terror unequalled in the history of the time.
How did German staff officers prepare plans for the campaign against Russia, giving consideration to the problem of security for all the necessary supply routes through the vast areas of the future theatre of operations. It was with these ideas in mind that this first article considerers how German Staff Estimates of the Situation were prepared.
Securing the Rear Areas
An entirely different situation prevailed on the Eastern Front rear areas where the vastness of the country, sparsely covered by German troops, presented a constant problem. The over-all manpower situation dictated that only a limited number of widely dispersed occupation units could be employed. The constant lengthening of communication lines because of the rapid progress of operations on the front line produced an increasing need for security forces in the rear areas.
In a nutshell, from the German point of view, the problem was approached in the following manner:
"What active and passive measures of security must be employed in order to deprive the partisan bands of their effectiveness or to reduce their effect to virtual insignificance?"
“Experience had shown that such considerations should not be confined to purely military aspects. In varying degree the politician, the public administrator, the military commander, and even the ordinary soldier have to deal with these questions.
By careful advance study, not only of the country itself but also of the people, their customs, cares, and needs, as well as their hopes and desires, one must be prepared to meet such methods and even to anticipate new tactics on the basis of current experiences. Combat forces, while they are in contact with the enemy, should never have to concern themselves with security problems of areas that lie behind them. That should always be the responsibility of higher echelons.” (2)
DIFFICULT TERRAIN
German Organisation of the Rear Areas
The particular problems anticipated during operations in the East prompted the German High Command to lay plans for the establishment of a security organization that would be more or less independent of the armies operating in the forward areas. In previous campaigns no more than weak security units had been organized and deployed. The arrangement for the Russian campaign included the formation of entire security divisions, (Sicherheitsdivisionen) (3) largely similar in composition and equipment to standard infantry divisions, with variations depending on the availability of personnel and materiel. The areas assigned to individual security divisions varied in size from 5,000 to 10,000 square miles.
The area immediately to the rear of an army group operations zone was designated as an army group rear area (Rueckwaertiges Heeresgebiet). The army group rear area commander (Kommandeur Rückwärtiges Heeresgebiet), was to be responsible for all active security measures, for the pacification of enemy territory, and, consequently, for the protection of all lines of communication. The security and pacification of occupied enemy territory behind the army group rear areas was to be the responsibility of the military occupation authorities.
Their administrative agencies were to cover the occupied territory in a network of Kommandanturen [Administrative area headquarters] of various levels, such as:
• Oberfeldkommandanturen [divisional level]
• Feldkommandanturen [regimentaI level,]
• Ortskommandanturen [company level].
Security forces of various strengths, as mentioned above, were to be assigned to these administrative units, depending on the size of the areas to be controlled. During the course of the Russian campaign, this organization made a substantial contribution toward the maintenance and security of German lines of communication from the homeland to the front.
To assure the security of future supply routes, active precautionary measures were taken, even during the advance, to prevent the destruction of vulnerable objectives. This is especially true of the main supply carrier—the railroads. In the final analysis it was the master plan of the Chief of Supply and Administration which determined, more than anything else, the over-all structure of the security organization.
FORWARD SUPPLY DEPOT
VITAL SUPPLY OF HOT FOOD
THE SUPPLY PLAN FOR THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN
Overview
The Supply plan was by its very nature complicated. Armoured spearheads were to be accompanied by heavy motor truck transportation units carrying supplies up to a distance of about 300 miles from the supply base. The motor truck transportation units were to establish supply depots approximately 50-75 miles apart set up in the immediate vicinity of large communities and preferably close to favourable railroad facilities. Particular emphasis was placed on the establishment of safe and adequate facilities for the storing of large quantities of supplies. As the combat elements continued to advance, a special security force was to be assigned to each of these supply depots to allow further development of the facility. The strength of these forces depended on the size of the installation, the area that had to be guarded, and the degree of danger from partisan activities.
At these central supply depots, other smaller supply depots were to be organized and distributed laterally in both directions. In this manner the infantry divisions, regardless of their route of advance, could obtain their supplies without the necessity for long-distance hauls. A "block system" of successive guard posts was to be established to safeguard the flow of supply from one depot to the next.
Passive Security Measures
Of the many passive means of protection, the following may be mentioned: Over poor roads, through endangered areas, or at night long supply columns were to move quickly and without interruption; single vehicles were to avoid passing through partisan-infested areas; full use was to be made of the block system of security established along the roads by driving in convoy from block to block; and unloaded supplies were to be dispersed for protection against destruction from the air.
Generally, the plan called for a regimental headquarters with the usual number of security battalions in the case of a larger town, while a battalion headquarters with the corresponding number of smaller units was to be employed for the protection of smaller installations. As far as possible, front line troops were to be relieved of all such security assignments. As it turned out later, this policy could never be fully enforced.
The protection of these supply depots involved a variety of problems. Internal security consisted of guarding the supply dumps and adjacent buildings and facilities. Since these installations were to include warehouses for all classes of supply, as for instance rations, clothing, ammunition, fuel, medical and veterinary equipment, as well as motor vehicles and spare parts, the need for security forces grew considerably as operations progressed. This circumstance had to be taken into account in all planning and especially in organizing security units. Furthermore, all installations necessary for the maintenance and operation of the supply depots, such as power plants, railroad stations, and airfields, as well as the billets of the security troops themselves, required additional protective measures. The fact that some of the larger supply installations assumed the proportions of a medium-sized city will give an indication as to the number of security troops that would become necessary.
Active Security Measures
German plans for active security also called for an active air defence. Anti-aircraft artillery units were to be provided for the protection of large or particularly important railroad stations, workshops, bridges, and similar installations. In each case the strength of these units depended on the availability of personnel and the importance of the installation. They were to be under the control of regional air force commanders. Fuel trains and similar shipments, which at a later stage of the campaign became unusually valuable, were to be protected wherever possible by railroad antiaircraft batteries consisting of 20-mm. four barreled guns mounted on flatcars. These units were under the command of the army group rail transportation officer.
As the above-mentioned plans and precautions indicate, the German Army High Command was by no means caught unawares by the strong partisan activities encountered during the Russian campaign. It was known for some time that the Russians were determined to use organized partisan warfare in the defence of their country and that they had used propaganda to spread the idea among their population. Their future military leaders in partisan warfare had been carefully trained in the use of this combat method. Just before the start of the campaign—according to information received in Germany—the Russian War Academy conducted war games in an area where certain locations were designated as so-called partisan centres.
Soviet Disruption Plans
Similarly, the Russian High Command had recognized at an early stage that, in contrast to the dense railroad and highway networks of the highly urbanized West with its ever-present possibilities for alternate routes, the very few serviceable supply routes through the vast expanse of the Russian area were of paramount strategic importance. Furthermore, in view of the great distances, the poor condition of the highways (which easily deteriorated under the influence of the weather), and the anticipated shortage of motor vehicles and fuel on the German side, the Russians realized that the main burden of supply would have to be carried by the railroads and that this would be equally true of all large-scale troop movements, furlough transportation, and evacuations. Clearly recognizing this handicap, which would present itself in any military campaign against Russia, the enemy began early in the war to build up a "second front" behind the German lines.
Appendix 1 Source: Feldgrau SECURITY DIVISION ORBAT
SAMPLE EASTERN FRONT SECURITY DIVISIONS - Source- Feldgrau (3)
The source material used to compile the text in all three articles is taken from many different sources. All photos displayed are assumed to be in the public domain. Where this is disputed the photo(s) will be removed.
A short bibliography is given at the end of each article giving the main sources of the text.
I have acknowledged the source where I have quoted from a published work. Any infringement of copyrighted material is unintended and will be corrected on notification.
Bibliography:
Leonid I. Grenkevich;The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1945: Critical Analysis of Historiography
Sources:
Feldgrau
US Army Centre of Military History
Wikipedia
1. Matthew Cooper. The phantom war: The
German Struggle Against Soviet Partisans, 1941-1944 (Macdonald and Janes, 1979).
2. Department of the (US) Army, Pamphlet 20-240, Washington, DC 1951
3. Feldgrau
4. Department of the (US) Army, Pamphlet 20-240, Washington, DC 1951