This short article will look at the actions of German front line forces during first 36 hours of the Ardennes Offensive - from 0700hrs on 16th December (0-Tag) to 1900hrs on the 17th. in the area of operations known as the 'Losheim Gap'. (See map). In particular the progress of two infantry divisions, 3.Fallschirm-Jäger and the 12th Volks Grenadier, of 1st SS Panzer Corps, in the attack. The Corps (Generalleutnant der Waffen-SS Hermann Priess), attacking on the south flank of the 6th Panzer Army, had one armoured division, the 1st SSLAH Panzer and two infantry divisions, the 3.Fallschirm-Jäger and the 12th Volks Grenadier.
The two infantry divisions would lead the attack while the armoured infantry 'kampfgruppen' from the 1st SS Panzer Division, including 'Kampfgruppe Peiper', were assembled close behind , in part as reinforcements for the breakthrough forces, in part because the VolksGrenadier unit was not used to fighting in close cooperation with armour.
West Front on the Day before the Ardennes Offensive
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The infantry divisions available to 1 SS Panzer Corps, the 12th Volksgrenadier Division and 3.Fallschirm-Jäger-Division, were probably the best available in the theatre of operations. Both had a core of experienced Officers and NCO's not available to other such divisions on the Ardennes front.
12th Volksgrenadier Division
The 12th Volksgrenadier Division, for example, was rebuilt in October 1944 in East Prussia with men from Mecklenburg and Vorpommern from the remains of the destroyed 12th Infantry Division, which was encircled during the defence of the town of Mogilev in the Belorussian SSR during Soviet Offensive 'Operation Bagration'. It was brought up to full strength and was fully equipped, certainly not common for the German units at this stage of the war, and sent to the Western front, arriving at the Roer River on Sep 16. The 12th VG fought the rest of the war in the west under Army Group B. It participated in the defense of Aachen, the Battle of the Hurtgen Forest, and the Battle of the Bulge and in April 1945 it surrendered at Wuppertal after the collapse of the Ruhr Pocket. Under its first commander Generalleutnant Gerhard Engel, a former adjutant to Hitler on his first combat command, it turned out to be a reliable unit that fought well against the US forces in the Ardennes.
OOB 12th Volksgrenadier Division 16Dec1944
Genmaj Gerhard Engel
27th Fusilier and 48th and 89th Volksgrenadier Regiments
12th Artillery Regiment
12th Antitank Battalion
12th Fusilier Battalion
12th Engineer Battalion
12th Signals Battalion
3.Fallschirm-Jäger-Division
The 3.Fallschirm-Jäger-Division was formed in October 1943 in Reims. In about February 1944, the division moved to the Brest area, under II.FsAK/Heeresgruppe D. The division was not ready for combat until May 1944, now under II.FsAK/AOK.7. On D-Day the division was stationed about midway between Quimper and Brest, and went into combat under II.FsAK / AOK.7. Saw heavy combat in Normandy, which severly depleted the division (partly destroyed in the Falaise pocket). During August and September the division fought on while withdrawing to the German border, ending up in Aachen in September 1944. From 24.9.1944 to 5.10.1944 the division was rebuilt in Oldenzaal, Belgium. Saw some action in Arnhem during this time, initially known as 'Kampfgruppe Becker'. The division participated in the Battle of the Bulge, and was again decimated in the defensive battles in Germany of 1945. The division was ordered to Niederbreisig on 15.3.45 by OB West, to be rebuilt again. FJR.9 had been totally destroyed and was replaced by the independent FJR.6. The division surrendered in the Ruhr-pocket. The division fought well in the Adrennes and provided Kampfgruppe Peiper with a 'screening force', as the narritive below tells, during the crucial dash to the Meuse River.
OOB 3.Fallschirm-Jäger-Division 16Dec1944
GenMaj. Walter Wadehn
Fallschirm-Jäger-Regiment 5
Fallschirm-Jäger-Regiment 8
Fallschirm-Jäger-Regiment 9
Fallschirm-Panzer-Jäger-Abteilung 3
Fallschirm-Artillerie-Regiment 3
Fallschirm-Flak-Abteilung 3
Fallschirm-Pionier-Bataillon 3
Fallschirm-Luftnachrichten-Abteilung 3
Fallschirm-Sanitäts-Abteilung 3
Map Showing the General Location of the 'Losheim Gap'
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Ist SS Panzer Corps Breaks through the 'Losheim Gap'
The German plan of attack saw the 1st SS Corps launch its assault at the western foot of the Schnee Eifel through a long narrow valley incised in the high plain, the so-called 'Losheim Gap'. Contrary to what the name may suggest, the Losheim Gap is no pleasant, pastoral valley but is cluttered by abrupt hills, some bare, others covered by fir trees and thick undergrowth. Most of the little villages here are found in the draws and potholes which further scoop out the main valley.
The 'Losheim Gap' was defended, on 16 December by a reinforced squadron of the 14th Cavalry Group and two regiments of the 99th and 106th Infantry Divisions. It also marked the boundary between both the US 99th and 106th Infantry and the US VIII Corps and V Corps.
Ultimately the fate of the 12th Volks Grenadier and the 3.Fallschirm-Jäger Divisions were bound together on that day by a lack of supporting artillery fire, official orders attaching the FJ and the VG to the 1st SS, by circumstances of difficult terrain and deteriorating weather, and by well-prepared and well-executed US plan of defence.
Losheimgraben - Gerolstein Forest through which
the 12Vg had to fight is on the top Right of the photo
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The 12th Volks Grenadier Division, had as its axis of attack the road to Büllingen (See Map) (route C on the right wing of 1st SS Corps axis of advance); its immediate objectives were the crossroads, The point of departure for the westward highway, at Losheimergraben and Bucholz Railstation (see Map and Photo) and the opening beyond the thick Gerolstein Forest section of the woods belt. Their ultimate objective was the attainment of a line at Nidrum and Weywertz, eight airline miles behind the American front, at which point the division was to face north as part of the infantry cordon covering the Sixth Panzer Army flank.
It was expected that Generalleutnant Engel’s 12th Volksgrenadier Division would take the town of Losheim by 0700 on the morning of the offensive. They would then continue the advance, take the Losheim-Losheimergraben road, clear mines and repair the bridges in the area, including an important railway overpass south of Losheimergraben, crucial to Kampfgruppe Peiper’s route.
If the latter were repaired by the engineers by 1200, Peiper had promised that he would be on the Meuse twelve hours later, a journey of some seventy-five miles. 12th Volksgrenadier Division had not, however, seized Losheim by 0700. The town fell soon afterward, but it was about as far as the 12th Volksgrenadiers were to get on 16 December. Generalleutnant Engel's force had run into unexpectedly fierce resistance from the 394th Infantry Regiment of the U.S. 99th Division and the key junctions of Losheimergraben and Bucholz Station remained in American hands 24 hours later.
The 12th Volksgrenadiers move over the start line had begun as soon as the artillery barrage lifted, about 0700, on the morning of the 16th. and by that time the assault regiments of the 12th Volksgrenadiers were already moving toward the American positions. The railtrack leading to Bucholz railstation marked the axis for the advance of the left wing of the Division, on the US side the railtrack marked a general boundary between the 1st and 3d Battalions of theUS 394th Infantry.
When the 12th VG's 48th Grenadier Regiment, commanded by Oberst Franz Osterhold, on the north axis, headed through the woods for the Losheimergraben crossroads, fallen trees, barbed wire, and mines, compounded with an almost complete ignorance of the forest trails, slowed their advance. The attack by the 27th Fuesilier Regiment, however had easier going, with much open country and a series of gaps in the terrain leading directly to the railtrack and the American defence positions.
The lack of highway bridges over the railroad south of Losheimergraben had turned the first day's battle for the Losheimergraben crossroads into an infantry fight in the surrounding woods. Both sides had sustained heavy losses. The 48th Grenadier Regiments assault platoons, finally completed its tortuous approach through the woods, mines, and wire, had pushed the 1st Battalion of the 394th back, but had failed to break through to the collection of customs buildings and houses at the Losheimgraben crossroads.
Losheimgraben is Taken
By daylight on 17 December the Americans held a fairly continuous but thinly manned front with the 1st Battalion around Losheimergraben, part of the 3d Battalion west of the village, and the 1st Battalion of the 23d Infantry holding the exposed right-flank position in Hünningen. The 12th, under pressure to take Losheimergraben, continued the attack with both its forward regiments, now considerably weakened. While the 27th Fuesilier Regiment moved to flank Losheimergraben on the west, the 48th Grenadier Regiment, still lacking sufficient fire support, continued its frontal attack.
The flanking attack was successful and at least a battalion of the 27th drove through a gap between the US 1st and 3rd Battalions. By 1100 the 27th th and 48th Regiments were able to bring the Losheim-Büllingen road under small arms fire and the noose was tightening on Losheimergrabens US defenders. The frontal attack, at the latter point, was resumed before dawn by Volksgrenadier patrols trying to find a way around the American firing line in the woods. Finally, the engineers from 12th's Pionier-Bataillon threw a bridge over the railroad at the demolished overpass on the Losheim road. At the same time three Mark IV tanks from 1st SS Regiment, supported by a rifle company from 1st Pzg Regt., appeared in the woods to the South of Buholz Station.
The 12th Volks Grenadier Division attack finally had broken through the American defence at Losheimgraben and its environs, but the division now was definitely behind schedule. The 48th Regiment, having been much reduced in strength in the fight around Losheimergraben, re-formed on the high ground between the forest edge and Mürringen. The north flank of the regiment lay exposed to counterattack, for the 277th Volks Grenadier Division on the right had been checked in its attempt to take the twin villages, Krinkelt-Rocherath. The fight now devolved on the 27th Regiment, which was ordered to take Hünningen before an attempt to roll up the American south flank.
Hunnigen Falls to the 12th - (See Map)
At 1600 the 27th Regiment of the 12th VG Division made its first assault on Hunnigen, preceded by six minutes of an artillery barrage from elements of 54th VolksWerfer Regiments and 388th Volksartillerie Corps.
When the artillery ceased, the Regiment supported by elements of 2nd SS Pzg Regiment, attacked through a neck of woods pointing toward the southeastern edge of Hünningen. A forward observer from the US 349th climbed into the church steeple and brought down murderous shellfire which kept pace with the grenadiers of the 27th until they were within a hundred yards of the American foxholes. Losses were heavy but the fuesiliers pressed on, in all the commander of the 27th sent forward seven "distinct attacking waves" in the course of the afternoon and early evening. The tenacity of the attacking force, although facing concentrations of the 394th's support weapons and heavy machineguns, finally paid off.
By 1700hrs on the 17th December, almost 36 hours after the offensive had begun the 12th Volksgrenadiers occupied Hunnigen and would finally defend the flank on a line Krinkeld - Bulligen. (See Map) The 12th infantry regiments were now severly weakened with some companies reporting over 50% casualties and, to add to their woes, the offensive on the North flank of the Losheim Gap area was now almost 24 hours behind schedule.
Generalleutnant Engel assessed the strength of his command and at sometime during the 18th December informed higher headquatrers that without reinforcements his division was incapable of conducting further offensive operations and adopted a defensive stance.
In spite of the courage shown by the inexperienced grenadiers of the Division the circumstances that led to the delays, when multiplied across the entire Ardennes front, were to have a significantly negative effect on whatever chance there was for the success of the offensive.
Left Hook - 3.Fallschirm-Jäger-Division Clears the Way (16th December 0700hrs to 17th December 1400hrs)
GenMaj. Walter Wadehn's 3.Fallschirm-Jäger-Division, forming the left (or South) wing of 1st SS Corps in the initial disposition for the attack had an axis of advance roughly following the southern shoulder of the Honsfeld or D route of the Corps axis of advance, (See Map), through the right flank of the 99th Division and took in most of the gap in the defences between the US 14th Cavalry and the 99th Division. Their objective in the first hours of the advance was to clear enemy forces from the Krewinkel-Berterath area. The final objective was ten miles behind the US front line to the northwest, the line Schoppen-Eibertingen named route D on the German battle plan.
On the morning of 16 December with assembly completed, the 5th and 9th Fallschirmjager Regiments faced elements of the 14th Cavalry Group south of Krewinkel and Manderfeld. North of the line the 8th Regiment, reinforced by tanks from 12th SS, also faced elements of 18th Cavalry Squadron, two reconnaissance platoons and one gun company of the 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion, plus the squadron and group headquarters at Manderfeld. South of the boundary the 294th and 295th Regiments of the 18th Volks Grenadier Division, forty assault guns, and a reinforced tank destroyer battalion also faced a smaller grouping from the 14th Cavalry.
The 3.Fallschirm-Jäger-Division continued its advance during the night, marching through the rough, heavily forested area northwest of Manderfeld and Lanzerath. Along the roads to the east the armored formations of the 1st SS Panzer Division toiled forward in the dark, ready to push through the opening between the American 99th Division and the 14th Cavalry Group. The cavalry flanks, however, rested on roads which would be essential to the enemy-roads along which the German armor was moving for commitment on the second day of the offensive. Until those routes were clear, the German 'Schwerpunkt' units was stalled.
"Take a ten minute break. We'll be back."
Advancing as the left flank of the I SS Panzer Corps, the 3.Fallschirm-Jäger-Division axis cut straight through the cavalry flanks then angled northwest in the direction of Faymonville. At Krewinkel, the most advanced American post in the area, elements of the Division hit part of the defensive positions of the 18th Cavalry and Company A of the 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion. The defenders occupied a position from which excellent observation and fields of fire covered all approaches to the village from the east.
An hour before dawn a two assault companies from 9th FsJ boldly approached the village in tactical formation. The US troopers held their fire until the parachutists were within twenty yards of the outer strands of wire-then cut loose. Momentarily surprised, the parachutists quickly resumed the assault and occupied half of the village but were forced to withdraw under heavy fire from the Tank Destroyer unit. With typical Fj elan history of the battle records that one of the last to leave shouted in English, "Take a ten minute break. We'll be back." True to their word the attackers soon forced the defenders to abandon their positions and withdraw westwards.
US military records show that shortly after 1600hrs on the 16th December, the 14th Cavalry Group executive officer telephoned the 106th Division command post and asked permission to withdraw to the Holzheim-Andler line, the division headquarters authorized the withdrawal. The last US troops left Manderfeld about 1700 on the 16th December, setting the town on fire.The 9th Regiment of the 3rd Division, carrying the left wing of the I SS Panzer Corps forward, immediately followed the retreating cavalry through Manderfeld, swung north, and by dusk the division occupied Lanzerath - only two kilometers from the US 394th Infantyr Regiment positions at Buchholz.
Breakout of Kampfgruppe Peiper
The 1st SS Panzer Division stood ready and waiting to exploit the opening made by the 9th Fj Regiment by an advance via Lanzerath onto the Honsfeld road. During the early evening of the 16th. Kampfgruppe Peiper rolled northwest to Lanzerath. Shortly after 0100 on 17 December, Peiper held a conference with his commanders, the advance must continue with all haste to Bucholz. Two Panthers would lead, followed by several platoons of infantry, from Diefenthal’s battalion of the 2nd SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment, in half-tracks. The rest of Peiper’s tanks and other vehicles would follow, including some of the Tigers of the 501st SS Battalion, which were just arriving. The bulk of 1st Fj battalion would “ride shotgun” on Peiper’s tanks, while one company of them would offer flank protection to the panzers, which were rather vulnerable to anti-tank fire at night.
At about 0200 on the 17 Dec. the kampfgruppe supported by the 9th Fj Regiment struck suddenly at Buchholz. The US forces defending the area were engulfed however one man, the company radio operator, escaped. Hidden in the cellar of the old battalion command post near the railroad station, he reported the units moving through the area. His almost hourly reports, kept US headquarters informed of the German movements. About 0400 on 17 December the main German column began its march through Buchholz. Still at his post, the radio operator counted thirty tanks, twenty-eight half-tracks filled with German infantry, and long columns of foot troops marching by the roadside. All of the kampfgruppe of the 1st SS Panzer Division and a considerable part of the 1st Battalion of the 9th Fj, providing flank protection for the kampfgruppe tanks, was moving toward Honsfeld.
Honsfeld is Occupied
The Honsfeld garison was surprised and routed. Peipers leading tanks simply joined th US traffic streaming westward, and, calmly led by a man signaling with a flashlight, rolled down the village streets. With Fj and Pzgr pouring in from all sides the Americans offered no concrete resistance, most engaged in a wild scramble to get out of town. Guns and vehicles, jammed on the exit roads, were abandoned; but many of the Americans, minus their equipment, escaped. The time was 1000hrs on the 17th December. By late morning Kampfgruppe Peiper overran both Schoppen and Moderscheid, encountering no resistance to speak of.
At this point, 1300 on the 17th December the elements of the 9th Fj rejoined the main body and pressed forward towards their final objective to the northwest, the line Schoppen-Eibertingen at Faymonville. (See Map)
Major Factors Controlling the Offensive in the First 36 Hours (Summary)
Terrain/Weather: The German forces were hampered by the narrow roads, barely capable of supporting armour leading to huge traffic delays as units converged on the bottlenecks. After the first 24 hours the cold weather began to produce its own casualties through hypothermia and frostbite.
Friendly Forces: The infantry divisions lacked not only experienced regimental commanders but, with some exceptions the necessary 'elan' needed to push forward the tactical advantage of complete surprise. In some cases the supporting assault artillery was unable to fulfil its role as the StuGs became a casualty of the terrain either not reaching their objectives or unable to manoeuvre in the narrow valleys frequently falling victim to LAWs.
Enemy Forces: The upset to battle plans due to the unexpected fierce resistance of the defenders. The overhead cover constructed during the quiet periods in the theatre meant the defenders were relatively immune from the artillery bombardment that preceded the attack. The record shows that only a relatively small number were neutralised by the bombardment, the majority retained their aggressive instincts and recovered relatively quickly.
Supply: The German Supply Plan in all of its aspects did not perform well during the offensive. The basic essentials, POL, ammunition, food and casevac fell increasingly behind schedule as the front moved westwards leaving forward units to 'scavenge' for the essentials. The US defenders were well supplied with large dumps of essentials located in the theatre, as the units retreated their supply situation improved as they reached rear supply dumps. The dumps were relatively unaffected by enemy air or artillery strikes.
Epilogue
The first forty-eight hours were crucial to the success of the offensive. This was indicated by the time-scale of the strategic planners at OKW. They expected the armoured columns to reach the Meuse by that time. According to the battle plan envisaged, the German offensive was seriously behind schedule at the close of the second day of combat. On the other hand, Model's own plan called for the Meuse to be reached and crossed on the fourth day of the offensive, then it seems reasonable to assume-as the Army commanders did assume - that the lost time could be regained. The immediate problem was to get armoured columns into the open and into the lead. Rundstedt's order,on the late evening of 17 December that the armour must at least keep up with the infantry elements reflected this concern.
In the Sixth Panzer Army sector the staff officers had expected that the infantry assault would penetrate to a depth of three to five miles by noon on the 16th, thus assuring a complete breakthrough within the first twenty-four hours of the offensive. This objective was not achieved. The assault to punch a hole at Losheim went so slowly that the spearhead armour of the 1st SS Panzer Division was delayed at its line of departure for at least six hours longer than anticipated. They would have been delayed even longer if Peiper had not seized the initiative and pushed his battlegroup through the melee
For the tactical planners at OKH, the exploitation phase of the offensive may be timed from the hour at which Peiper's armour shook itself loose from the melee at Losheim and broke into the open, that is, 0400 on 17 December. Peiper's progress, therefore, is a good measure of the speed, planned and actual, of the German advance. The 1st SS Panzer Division and at least one other armoured division of the Sixth Panzer Army were supposed to be across the rugged plateau of the Hohes Venn by the close of the second day, with their leading elements along a north-south line through Spa and Stavelot.
Despite all the delays on the 16th, Peiper did reach Stavelot on the night of 17 December, but at Stavelot he was forced to halt - a marked departure from the German experience of 1940. Recall as well that the second of the Sixth Panzer Army's breakthrough armoured divisions, the 12th SS Panzer still was involved in a bitter fight back on the line of scrimmage at the end of this second day. The Fifth Panzer Army was in even worse case: no armoured exploitation was yet in progress by the night of 17 December.
However, on the third day of the attack the German armour began to acquire momentum; the greatest gains made by the armoured spearhead columns actually were achieved during the night of 18 December. With the way west thus clearing, the mass of the German logistical supply units behind the armoured columns also picked up speed on 19 December, this day representing the most rapid movement of the entire offensive. Yet even now the bulk of German armoured weight was not forward nor operating with the speed and mobility expected of armour. For this reason the Fifth Panzer Army was assigned the task of exploitation, in place of the Sixth, on 20 December.
For those interested there a few graphics (best viewed in large format) showing the general positions of the 12th and 3rd Divisions, during the timeframe I have used, at this site:
http://www.december44.com/anglais/index.html
Notes:
The source material used to compile the text in this article is taken from many different sources. All photos displayed are assumed to be in the public domain.
I have acknowledged the source where I have quoted from a published work.
Bibliography:
Battle of the Bulge – The Definitive Account – Charles B McDonald, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London 1984)
Sources:
Feldgrau
US Army Centre of Military History
Wikipedia
(This article was First published on Irish Axis Forum website in October 2009)
